This paper tests the notion that private firms are more tax aggressive than public firms. Tax avoidance measures, e.g. effective tax rates, cannot be used to compare private and public firms when private and public firms have different levels of importance on financial accounting earnings (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). To disentangle financial reporting incentives from tax aggressiveness, I use the fact that European groups must prepare two sets of financial statements: first, group statements (consolidated), which provide information to investors, and, second, individual statements (unconsolidated), which are used for legal purposes, but not to inform investors. Since in individual statements financial reporting incentives do not vary between public and private firms, I use these effective tax rates to compare private and public firms. My findings show that public, not private, firms are more tax aggressive, as the effective tax rates of public firms are lower in individual and group statements.
I. INTRODUCTION
The common notion in financial and tax accounting is that financial reporting of private firms is more likely to be influenced by taxation, and thus private firms are more (likely to be) tax aggressive (e.g. Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin 2010; Kosi and Valentincic 2012; Lin, Mills, and Zhang 2014) . In line with this notion, prior literature shows that public firms have higher financial non-tax reporting costs that result in larger book-tax differences (Cloyd, Pratt, and Stock 1996; Mills and Newberry 2001) . However, one cannot infer from these results that private firms are more tax aggressive, as book-tax differences cannot be used to compare firms with varying levels of importance on financial accounting earnings (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010) . Larger book-tax differences could be the result of inflated financial accounting earnings or the result of tax aggressiveness. Thus, prior literature does not distinguish between tax aggressiveness and financial reporting incentives. If, for example, private firms are more tax aggressive but public firms inflate earnings, both types of firms appear to have the same effective tax rate. Summing up, prior literature does not show whether private firms are indeed more tax aggressive. Therefore, this paper empirically investigates whether private or public firms are more tax aggressive. 1 There are various reasons to observe different levels of tax aggressiveness between private firms and public firms due to varying costs and benefits for the involved parties. Public firms could face higher costs associated with aggressive tax strategies, as they usually have a higher level of mandatory disclosure than private firms. This could lead to less tax aggressiveness, as more information increases the ability of tax authorities to detect aggressive 3 tax strategies (Hope, Ma, and Thomas 2013; Jacob, Rohlfing-Bastian, and Sandner 2014) . Thus, public firms might be less tax aggressive than private firms. However, public firms may also have higher benefits associated with tax aggressiveness when earnings targets are based on aftertax earnings. Managers might be inclined to reach these earnings targets by using aggressive tax strategies (Dhaliwal, Gleason, and Mills 2004) . Ultimately, it is an empirical question as to whether listing status shapes tax aggressiveness. To tackle this question, I exploit the fact that European groups must provide two different sets of financial reports, namely (1) individual (i.e. separate or unconsolidated) statements and (2) group (consolidated) statements.
In many European countries, individual statements are the starting point to determine the tax obligation, and the same tax rules apply for private and public firms. Calculating the effective tax rates based on individual statements overcomes the problem of varying levels of financial reporting incentives between public and private firms, as there is no evidence that investors use individual statements. Instead, there are multiple forms of evidence that investors do not use individual statements: (i) individual statements are not covered in earnings calls, (ii) they often cannot be found online in investor relations sections, (iii) there are no analyst forecasts based on individual statements, (iv) key indicators such as earnings per share (EPS) are based on consolidated after-tax earnings and (v) even if all individual statements of a group were available, combining them is not only very costly, but meaningless for investors without taking intercompany transactions into account.
2 Thus, I can observe effective tax rates for public and private firms, absent capital market pressure and earnings management incentives that would affect the denominator (pre-tax income) differently for public and private firms. 4 The sole purpose of group statements is to provide information, and there is no book-tax alignment. As public and private firms have different financial reporting incentives, investigating only group statements would not allow for conclusions about the difference in tax aggressiveness of public and private firms.
The analyses use two sets of data. I start with a detailed German sample, and then verify that the German results are generalizable in a broader European context. Starting with Germany is especially useful, as a unique feature of the German setting is that the effective tax rate of the individual statement of the parent captures not only the effective tax rate of the parent, but the effective tax rate of the full tax group. 3 In both samples, Germany and Europe, I compute two different effective tax rates for each company based on the individual statements of the parents and group statements.
The findings of this paper show that German (European) public firms are more tax aggressive than private firms, and the magnitude is highly significant. 4 Conditional on controlling for other factors, public firms have, on average, an effective tax rate that is 4.4 (2.4)
percentage points lower in their individual statements and an effective tax rate that is 4.6 (2.0)
percentage points lower in their group statements. Neglecting the costs of tax aggressiveness, this reduction translates into a reduction of approximately 0.5 percentage point return on equity per year for an average firm.
3 Germany permits tax consolidation of domestic subsidiaries (Organschaft), and in order to benefit from this tax consolidation firms are required to transfer all pre-tax profits to the parent. The pooled profit in the individual statement of the parent is then used as a starting point to calculate the tax liability. Therefore, the individual statement of the parent captures the effective tax rate of the entire tax group. 4 It is unlikely that firms' tax aggressiveness influences the decision to go public. Thus, endogeneity is not a concern. However, the decision to go public is a choice made by management which could potentially introduce the problem of omitted correlated variables when the determinants to go public affect tax aggressiveness. Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) show that mainly the firms' size and industry characteristics are related to the decision to go public. Thus, the models control for size and include industry fixed effects. Furthermore, I repeat all analyses with a propensity score matched subsample. The results remain qualitatively the same. Furthermore, I find that when firms carry out an IPO, the effective tax rate decreases consecutively.
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The difference in effective tax rates of public versus private firms based on the group statements are in the same direction and similar magnitude as in individual statements.
Furthermore, both effective tax rates are highly correlated (Pearson: 0.63). Thus, I conclude that the difference in effective tax rates between public and private firms exists not only domestically at the level of individual statements, but likely also for the whole group as indicated by group statements.
I conduct additional tests to corroborate the results. When I limit the sample to firms that carried out an IPO during the sample period, the findings show that firms become more tax aggressive after the IPO. Furthermore, the results are not influenced by different levels of conforming tax avoidance or using long-run effective tax rates over a period of 10 years.
This paper contributes to the literature by showing that the general notion that private firms are more tax aggressive seems to be premature. While prior literature found that private firms have higher book-tax differences (e.g. Cloyd et al. 1996; Mills and Newberry 2001) and are more likely to shift income across jurisdictions (Beuselinck, Deloof, and Vanstraelen 2015) , the findings of this paper show that public firms, not private ones, are more tax aggressive.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides details on the institutional setting, while section III reviews the literature and develops the hypotheses. Section IV reports results for the German sample, and section V for the European sample. Section VI provides corroborating results, and section VII offers conclusions.
II. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
This section provides detailed information on the institutional setting in Germany.
Germany is especially useful when investigating the differences between private and public firms, as the tax rules are the same for both private and public firms. Furthermore, as described below in more detail, a unique feature of Germany is that the effective tax rate computed based 6 on the individual statement of the parent captures not only the effective tax rate of the parent's income, but also the entire tax group in Germany (i.e. including the income of all domestic subsidiaries).
Individual and group accounts in Germany
Traditionally, Germany has a high book-tax alignment (Pfaff and Schröer 1996) .
Nevertheless, some researchers find that Germany has low book-tax conformity (e.g. Atwood, Drake, and Myers 2012; Tang 2014 i.e. the full domestic operations of the group (Appendix A gives a simplified numerical example of how effective tax rates of individual and group statements are calculated).
Similar to the institutional setting in Panel A, there are no differences between the effective tax rates of private firms and public firms. Thus, this setting allows me to compare the effective tax rates of public and private firms mainly for three reasons. First, both public and private firms must follow the same accounting rules (German GAAP). Second, there is no need 5 From a group perspective, it is tax beneficial to form a tax group where all German subsidiaries transfer their pretax profit directly to the parent where the profit is taxed. Oestreicher and Koch (2010) show that firms entered into a tax group especially after the introduction of the territorial system in 2001. It is unlikely that German subsidiaries pay dividends (after tax) to the parent company, as the profit would partly be taxed twice -first, at the level of the subsidiary and second, 5% of the dividend income of the parent company would be taxed at the statutory tax rate. Thus, German firms should have transfers of profits and losses to the parent company, and all profits are taxed at the level of the parent company.
8 to estimate the extent to which the effective tax rate is influence by foreign income. Third, and more importantly, there is no evidence that capital market participants use individual statements.
Thus, there are no differences in the importance of financial accounting earnings, and it is suitable to compare the effective tax rates of public and private firms.
In contrast to individual statements, group statements are differently affected by financial reporting incentives between private and public firms (capital market incentives). The effective tax rate of group statements captures three different parts, namely the effective tax rate on domestic income, the effective tax rate on foreign income and financial reporting incentives.
Insert Table 1 here
III. LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
To date, little research has been conducted in the context of private firms or as regards the differences between private and public firms. Among the first to study the differences between private and public firms were Penno and Simon (1986) . Using a questionnaire, they find that publicly-traded firms are more likely to use income-increasing accounting methods. A similar finding is shown by Beatty and Harris (1998) , who find that publicly listed banks engage in more earnings management than private banks. In contrast, Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz (2006) find that private firms engage more in earnings management. This effect is increased in countries with stronger tax alignment for private firms, but not for public firms. Coppens and Peek (2005) find that in the absence of capital markets, European private firms avoid reporting small losses in countries with low book-tax alignment. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) find that earnings of UK private firms show less timely loss recognition than public firms. Similarly, Peek, Cuijpers, and Buijink (2010) show that shareholders of private firms demand less symmetric timeliness than shareholders of public firms.
9
Most studies related to taxation, study differences in book-tax differences between private and public firms. Cloyd et al. (1996) show that public firms have higher financial non-tax reporting costs that result in larger book-tax differences. Mills and Newberry (2001) confirm the survey results of Cloyd et al. (1996) with actual tax return data. Klassen (1997) uses inside ownership concentration as a proxy for reduced capital market pressure. His findings are consistent with the idea that managers of closely held firms are better able to signal their ability through direct communications, and thus have lower pressure to use income-increasing accounting choices.
Prior literature that examined differences between public and private firms has looked into differences in income shifting. Lin et al. (2014) show that private firms shift income more from a high-to a low-tax year in response to a local tax rate change in China. Beuselinck et al. (2015) find that European multinationals shift income from high-to low-tax countries, and the effect is more pronounced for private firms. Although these findings indicate that private firms are more tax aggressive, income shifting is only one mechanism to reduce the tax burden. Tax strategies might be systematically different between private and public firms, as profit shifting currently receives much (negative) media attention, and public firms are more likely to be covered in the financial press. Thus, public firms potentially face higher costs associated with income shifting and, consequently, use alternative mechanisms (for example aggressive tax strategies within countries) to reduce their tax burdens. Chen et al. (2010) raise the question as to whether family firms are more tax aggressive than non-family firms. Their main finding is that family firms have higher effective tax rates and thus are considered less tax aggressive. Chen et al. (2010) Generally, the decision to engage in aggressive tax strategies depends on the costs and benefits for the involved parties. Tax savings lead to rent extraction for shareholders and to higher salaries/bonuses for managers if they are incentivized accordingly. Whereas the benefits are obvious, the costs of tax avoidance can be direct or indirect. Direct costs are, for example, the costs of establishing complex tax structures within the group, as well as payments for tax advisors. Indirect costs are, for example, the increased likelihood of sanctions from the tax authorities and reputational costs. Thus, when managers trade off the costs and benefits, they have to incorporate multiple layers, and costs and benefits of tax aggressiveness could be different between public and private firms.
Aggressive tax strategies could be more costly for public firms for several reasons. Public firms are required to disclose more information about, e.g. earnings, than private firms. This in turn helps the tax authority to detect aggressive tax strategies, and public firms would be less likely to engage in aggressive tax planning than private firms. Mandatory disclosure is used in a model by Jacob et al. (2014) that aims at providing a theoretical background to explain crosssectional differences in tax avoidance. The decision to engage in tax avoidance in a principal-11 agent setting depends on the costs and benefits associated with tax avoidance. Tax planning costs are increased for public firms due to the higher amount of disclosure. Their assumptions are in line with the results of Hope et al. (2013) . The authors find that disclosure of regional earnings distribution is associated with lower worldwide effective tax rates. In particular, Hope et al.
(2013) investigate the effects of the 1998 implementation of SFAS 131 which made geographic disclosures no longer mandatory.
Furthermore, aggressive tax strategies increase book-tax differences. When investors are not able to distinguish whether high book-tax differences are the result of inflated earnings or tax strategies, large book-tax differences are considered a "red flag" to investors and enforcement agencies (Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew 2004; Hanlon 2005 ). Overall, a higher level of disclosure and costs associated with high book-tax differences of public firms are potentially associated with less tax aggressiveness and thus higher effective tax rates.
However, capital market participants could also incentivize managers of public firms to be more tax aggressive than private firms. It might be that capital market participants require public firms to engage in aggressive tax strategies, as competition on equity markets pressures managers to be more profitable. Bhojraj and Libby (2005) show that when managers are faced with high capital market pressure, managers behave more myopically when they report quarterly compared to semi-annually. Managers might be inclined to reach these earnings targets with aggressive tax strategies. Dhaliwal et al. (2004) find that firms decrease their effective tax rate in the fourth quarter in order to meet or beat the consensus analysts forecast. Thus, whether public firms or private firms are more tax aggressive is an open question, and I state the hypothesis in the null as follows.
H: There is no difference in tax aggressiveness between private firms and public firms.
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IV. EFFECTIVE TAX RATES IN GERMANY Sample
The data 
Research design individual statements
As mentioned, individual statements are the starting point for the tax return.
Nevertheless, some adjustments are made afterwards. In Germany, only five percent of the dividends are subject to taxation. Furthermore, depreciation of shares in affiliated companies is 13 not tax-deductible. To really capture the effective tax rate (ETR), pre-tax income is adjusted accordingly. 7 The effective tax rate is then computed as income tax deflated by adjusted pre-tax income. 8 As the calculation of ETR does not include deferred taxes, any differences between private and public firms consist of permanent differences. 
If the effective tax rate were just the statutory tax rate multiplied by the pre-tax income,
we would observe that all firms have exactly the same effective tax rate. However, in reality, we observe significant differences in the cross-section of firms. The effective tax rate is different from the statutory tax rate, as there are tax exempt revenues and non-tax deductible costs.
Furthermore, the German legislature allows leeway in recognition and subsequent valuation of assets and liabilities (e.g. accelerated depreciation schedules) which influence the effective tax rate. Another way to reduce the tax burden in Germany is to strategically optimize the location of operations, as each municipality levies a local business tax. Generally, the tax strategies are not observable. However, there are multiple items of evidence, apart from the observed crosssectional differences in effective tax rates, that firms seek to reduce their tax burden. In Germany, for example, 2.4% of all firms in 2014 where subject to tax enforcement actions, and firms had to pay an additional 17.9 billion euro in taxes (German Federal Ministry of Finance 2015).
14 The analyses use OLS regression design. The dependent variable is the effective tax rate (ETR) and the main variable of interest is PUBLIC, which is coded one if the respective firm is publicly listed and zero otherwise. In line with Chen et al. (2010) , I include the variable FAMILY, which is coded one if the majority of the shares 10 are owned by families. Ownership data are based on the last available data in the Orbis Database, and are thus time-invariant.
However, family ownership is usually long-term investments, as family owners are often the founders or founding family of a company.
The subscript "i" indicates that data from individual statements are used. If there is no subscript "i", this means that the variable is the same for individual and group statements (e.g.
PUBLIC)
. Control variables are mostly in line with prior literature (e.g. Chen et al. 2010) . I control for profitability and include return on assets (ROA). Leverage (DEBT) is defined as debt over total assets. PPE is property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. Intangible assets (INTANG) is defined as intangible assets deflated by total assets. Tax planning activities incur fixed costs, and bigger firms are more likely to have the funds to engage in aggressive tax planning. Therefore, SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. I do not include a market-based measure for size or the market-to-book ratio, as the required data are not available for private firms. Similar to FAMILY, STATE is coded one if the majority of the shares is owned by either the federal republic, the 16 federal states or any municipality. 11 Fixed effects are included for time (year), industry and legal form 12 when indicated.
The models for the individual statements do not explicitly control for foreign operations or subsidiaries in, for example, tax havens. When firms shift profits from Germany to a tax haven, the profit would be taxed in the foreign subsidiary. Therefore, profit shifting across countries to reduce the tax burden would affect the effective tax rate of only the group statement, but not the individual statement. This setting circumvents the problem of estimating the extent to which foreign operations are due to operational decisions, due to tax minimization or both.
Research design group statements
The research design for the group statements is similar to that for individual statements.
Effective tax rates and most control variables are calculated in the same way, the only difference being that now data from group statements are used instead of data from individual statements (indicated by the subscript "g"). In contrast to the effective tax rates of individual statements, effective tax rates of group statements are affected by the geographical structure of the group. Therefore, the empirical tests for the group statements additionally include #SUBS, which is the number of subsidiaries and fixed effects for each foreign country where the subsidiaries are located (FEg,SUBS). If, for example, a group has a subsidiary in France and Italy, both fixed effects would take on the value of one. Therefore, I control for the influence of foreign income on effective tax rates of groups and opportunities for profit shifting. Both the number of subsidiaries and the respective countries are time-invariant data from the Orbis database.
Furthermore, the model includes a binary variable IFRS, which is coded one if the group adopted the International Financial Reporting Standards for its consolidated statement. The table shows that the effective tax rates of public firms are lower than those of private firms. Within the individual (group) statements, the average effective tax rate of private firms is 31.0% (32.6%) and the average effective tax rate of public firms is 27.2% (29.4%). Untabulated t-tests show that the differences are statistically significant. Similarly, the median effective tax rate of public firms is lower in both samples. These univariate comparisons indicate that public firms are more tax aggressive than private firms.
In both samples, private firms are less profitable, have more PPE, are smaller and have less intangible assets than public firms. Group statements in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards are prepared by 10.4% of the private firms and 76.4% of the public firms. Approximately the same proportion of private firms (16.0%) and public firms (16.4%) are majority owned by families (FAMILY).
Only 1.7% of the public firms are owned by the state, whereas 18.2% of the private firms are majority state owned (STATE). The high ratio of state owned private firms is probably explained by the higher number of gas and electricity distributers in Germany (Pierk and Weil 2016) which are mostly required by EU regulation to be organized as a group (European Parliament 2003) and are mostly wholly owned by the respective municipality where they are located. On average, public firms have more subsidiaries (159 vs. 93) and these subsidiaries are located in more different countries (11.3 vs. 3.2).
Insert Table 2 here Table 3 ETR is negatively correlated with ROA and PPE. Within the group statements, IFRS is negatively correlated with ETR. Furthermore, the effective tax rates of the individual statements and the group statements are highly correlated (Pearson: 0.63, not tabulated). The correlation is stronger among private firms (Pearson: 0.69, not tabulated) than among public firms (Pearson: 0.46, not tabulated). The difference could be explained by higher financial reporting incentives of public firms in the group statements.
Insert Table 3 here 18 The multivariate results test the predictions separately for individual statements and for group statements. The dependent variable is the effective tax rate (ETR). Standard errors are clustered at firm level. Model 1 to Model 4 of Table 4 provide the results for the individual statements. First, the results show the univariate association between ETR and PUBLIC (Model 1), then fixed effects are included (Model 2) and Model 3 controls for other determinants of tax aggressiveness. Across all models, the coefficient of PUBLIC is negative and highly significant.
The coefficient of -0.044 means (Model 3) that the effective tax rate of public firms is 4.4 percentage points lower than that of private firms. The coefficient of FAMILY is positive, and the magnitude and the level of significance is lower than the coefficient of PUBLIC. However, the 2.3 percentage points difference between family and non-family firms (Model 3) is economically significant. The control variables show that more profitable firms (ROA), firms with more PPE (PPE), and bigger firms (SIZE) have lower effective tax rates.
As linear regressions make strong assumptions about linearity, Model 4 uses a subsample based on a propensity score matching. The first stage thereby estimates the likelihood of being public. Each public firm is then matched with a private firm based on the propensity of being publicly listed (nearest neighbour matching with a caliper of 5% and no replacement). The sample is reduced to 541 public firm-year observations and 541 private firm-year observations. The coefficient of PUBLIC does not change and the coefficient of FAMILY increases to 7.0. The very high coefficient of FAMILY could potentially be affected by the low number of familyowned firms in the matched sample.
Models 5 to 9 repeat the analyses using data from the group statements. Model 8 includes the respective propensity score matched results for the group statements. Here, the sample size is Table 5 indicates that in all countries but Belgium, tax consolidation is allowed at least under some circumstances.
Although almost all countries officially levy tax on worldwide income, all countries exempt between 95% and 100% of foreign dividends/income when certain conditions are met. Tax loss carry-forward periods vary among countries and range between 10 years and infinity. France, Germany and Norway allow firms to carry back losses, but the carry-back amount is limited. The tax rules are the same for public and private firms, and thus allow for comparisons between public and private firms. Insert Table 5 here
Sample and research design
In the European sample, I use European individual and group statements from the Orbis database. The first search criterion was the consolidation code "C2/U2 (companies with both types of accounts)" to ensure that both the individual and group statements were available. Next, data on individual statements and group statements were downloaded separately and merged based on the Bureau van Dijk identifier. The sample period covers all available data from 2005 to 2014. Due to data availability and further restrictions, (for example not every country has a sophisticated stock market), I limit the sample to eight European countries (Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Norway, Spain and Sweden) and delete banks, insurance companies and non-profit organizations. 13 In order to compute effective tax rates, the sample contains only firmyear observations with positive pre-tax income. In total, the sample contains 46,530 firm-year observations.
The analyses are mainly the same as in the German sample. The dependent variable is ETR and the main variable of interest is PUBLIC, which is coded one if the respective firm is publicly listed and zero otherwise. The only difference is that PRETAX is not adjusted in the 13 Countries are included if at least 30 firm-year observations of private firms and 30 firm-year observations of public firms are available. In some countries, matching the individual statements of the parent with the group statement led to an insufficient number of observations, e.g. the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
22
European sample. Model 3 is used for individual statements and Model 4 is used for group statements. Panel E of Table 6 shows the average effective tax rate for each country. In five out of eight countries (Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy and Spain), the effective tax rate of public firms is statistically significantly lower than that of private firms, within both the individual statements and the consolidated statements. For Sweden, the effect can be found only within the group statements. Only in France and Norway are public firms not more tax aggressive than private firms.
Findings: Europe
Insert Table 6 here Insert Table 7 here Overall, the effect is similar to the individual statements, and public firms have lower effective tax rates and are thus considered as more tax aggressive.
Insert Table 8 here
VI. CORROBORATING RESULTS
Conforming tax avoidance
Measures of tax avoidance (e.g. effective tax rates or book-tax differences) generally provide information about non-conforming tax avoidance, but not about conforming tax avoidance. However, prior literature shows that firms also engage in conforming tax strategies (e.g. Guenther 1994, Maydew 1997). In my setting, using individual statements, both types of firms have the same opportunities to engage in non-conforming and conforming tax avoidance, as capital market participants do not use individual statements. Given this setting, to the best of my knowledge, there is no rationale as to why public firms are more tax aggressive when using non-conforming tax strategies but not more tax aggressive when using conforming tax strategies.
Nevertheless, I use tax expense deflated by lagged total assets as a proxy that captures both conforming and non-conforming tax avoidance. 15 The upside of using this measure is that the denominator is not influenced by current year's earnings management or conforming tax strategies. The downside is that this measure assumes that public and private firms have a similar asset structure that generates similar taxable profits. Furthermore, if public firms smooth earnings more or take earnings big baths more often, this would influence the amount of taxes paid, and in this case private and public firms are hardly comparable. However, if I still find the effect that public firms are more tax aggressive, this indicates that the results are robust to 15 The measure is motivated by Badertscher et al. (2016) , who use the ratio of cash taxes paid to lagged total assets. However, cash taxes paid is not available in a European setting.
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conforming tax strategies and at the same time justifies the use of such tax avoidance measures.
For a more detailed discussion of conforming and non-conforming tax avoidance, see
Badertscher et al. (2016).
Panel A of Table 9 provides the results of the individual statement, and Panel B the results of the group statements. The number of observations is reduced in both samples, as the dependent variable is deflated by lagged total assets and is not available for all firm-years. In both samples I still find that public firms are more tax aggressive, as the coefficients of PUBLIC is negative and statistically significant in both samples (columns "All"). The country-by-country analyses show that the effect can be found in some countries, but not all. Nevertheless, based on the rationale that there is no theoretical argument as to why we would expect to find different results for a joint measure of conforming and non-conforming tax aggressiveness, and based on the findings of Table 9 , I conclude that public firms are more tax aggressive.
Insert Table 9 here
IPOs in Europe
In this section, I limit the sample to firms that carried out an IPO within the sample period. This allows me to investigate whether there is a change after the IPO in tax aggressiveness. The sample contains 520 firm-year observations of 99 unique firms that carried out an IPO where I have at least one observation in the pre-IPO period and one in the post-IPO period. The analyses include firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant characteristics.
Furthermore, year fixed effects control for time effects (e.g. changes in statutory tax rates). As the IPO dates are not clustered in time, I do not include a control sample. Thus, I test whether changing the listing status from "not listed" to "publicly listed" has an effect on tax aggressiveness. Table 10 indicates that when firms carry out an IPO, they are more tax aggressive afterwards.
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Insert Table 10 here
Long-run effective tax rate
The sample so far does not contain firms with negative pre-tax income. This selection could potentially affect the results if losses, and thus tax loss offsetting, is not equally distributed among private and public firms. As effective tax rates of firm-years with negative pre-tax income are not meaningful, I cannot include them in my sample. However, it is reasonable to compute long-run effective tax rates over several years and exclude firms only where the sum of the pretax income is negative. This has several advantages. First, the sample selection problem is reduced, as firm-years with negative pre-tax income are included. Second, this approach reduces the problem of tax loss offsetting. And third, Dyreng et al. (2008) show that annual effective tax rates are not necessarily predictive for the long-run tax avoidance strategy.
In Table 11 , the dependent variable is the average effective tax rate. I include only firms with data on the full sample period of 10 years (including loss years). This sample period ensures 27 that the average effective tax rates are computed using the same years and thus the same statutory tax rates. Otherwise it could be problematic if, for example, public firms are more likely to have data on the full sample period, but data on private firms are more likely to be available in later years where the statutory tax rates are lower. The previous analyses controlled for this using time fixed effects. This is not possible in the long-run analyses, as only one observation per firm is included. In total, the analyses include 1,764 unique firms.
In line with Gallemore and Labro (2015) Insert Table 11 here
VII. CONCLUSION
The common notion is that private firms are more tax aggressive, as they face lower nontax costs of financial reporting. In contrast, this paper provides evidence that public firms, not private firms, are more tax aggressive. The results can be found within individual and group statements. Furthermore, I find the mentioned effect in a detailed analysis using German data and confirm the generalizability of the results in other European countries. However, there seem to be differences between countries, as in some countries the effect is absent. Thus, future research may identify reasons for these cross-country differences. Nevertheless, the common notion that private firms are more tax aggressive seems to be premature.
The differences in effective tax rates between public and private are highly significant.
However, I cannot observe the costs associated with tax aggressiveness. Thus, the benefit of, for 28 example, a 4 percentage point reduction in the effective tax rates must be evaluated against the costs of tax planning, assuming that companies choose their optimal level of tax planning activities. However, the differences are still very important and should be interesting for investors in evaluating benefits and risks associated with the respective investment, and for policy makers in planning enforcement activities.
A caveat of this paper is that public firms are defined by being listed on equity markets.
Thus, I do not control for the existence of public debt in the sample of private firms. However, in most European countries -and in Germany in particular -it is not common that firms with nonlisted equity engage in public debt markets. Instead, private firms use a close relationship with banks or even only one specific (house) bank (Harhoff and Körting 1998). In this example, a German parent company wholly owns two subsidiaries. Subsidiary 1 is located in Germany and Subsidiary 2 is located in Spain. All three companies have a pretax profit of 100. The German subsidiary transfers its pre-tax profit to the parent company, and the respective profit is taxed at the level of the parent company. Thus, the tax base of the parent company is 200 and the parent company pays 60 to the tax authorities. The Spanish subsidiary pays the domestic tax and pays out dividends to the parent company. As Germany has a territorial tax system, no further taxes are due. The dividends are not included in the tax base of the parent company, and thus the effective tax rate of the parent remains unchanged. If the Spanish subsidiary does not pay out dividends, the effective tax rate would not change either. This is a simplified example (e.g. Germany taxes 5% of foreign dividends with the German statutory tax rate). Group statement: From a group perspective, no transfer of profits or dividend payouts took place. Thus, the pre-tax profit is 300. Unless additional disclosure shows precisely where the profits are earned, it is not possible to observe tax aggressiveness, as the composition of statutory tax rates is not observable. Additionally, financial reporting incentives could affect the effective tax rate of the group, e.g. if earnings are overstated or understated (not in this example). ETR is income tax divided by PRETAX. PRETAX is calculated as net income plus total tax minus 0.95*dividends plus depreciation of financial assets. ROA is return on assets. DEBT is debt deflated by total assets. PPE is property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. INTANG is intangible assets deflated by total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. FAMILY is coded one if the majority of the shares is owned by families. STATE is coded one if the majority of the shares is owned by either the federal republic, the 16 states or any municipality. #SUBS is the number of subsidiaries of the group. #COUNTR is the number of different countries where the subsidiaries are located. IFRS is coded one if the financial statement is prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards. All nondichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
Individual Statements
PUBLICt -0.09*** 0.18*** -0.25*** -0.35*** 0.33*** 0.07*** 0.01 -0.23*** 0.13*** 0.30*** 0.66*** ETRi,t -0.09*** -0.20*** 0.08*** -0.06*** 0.01 0.01 0.04** -0.05*** 0.02 0.04** -0.12*** ROAi,t 0.12*** -0.12*** -0.40*** -0.31*** 0.04** -0.15*** 0.16*** -0.18*** 0.03* 0.07*** 0.18*** DEBTi,t -0.31*** 0.06*** -0.34*** 0.20*** -0.09*** 0.17*** -0.08*** 0.14*** 0.02 -0.02 -0.24*** PPEi,t -0.27*** -0.06*** -0.21*** 0.26*** -0.35*** 0.07*** -0.13*** 0.50*** -0.16*** -0.25*** -0.44*** INTANGi,t 0.04** 0.01 0.01 0.04** -0.08*** 0.11*** 0.02 -0.17*** 0.10*** 0.25*** 0.39*** SIZEi,t 0.06*** -0.05*** -0.12*** 0.17*** 0.06*** -0.11*** -0.14*** 0.04** 0.37*** 0.53*** 0.17*** FAMILY 0.01 0.04** 0.15*** -0.07*** -0.11*** 0.06*** -0.15*** -0.17*** -0.12*** 0.05*** -0.05*** STATE -0.23*** 0.01 -0.11*** 0.08*** 0.30*** -0.08*** 0.00 -0.17*** -0.11*** -0.13*** -0.23*** 0.38*** 0.18*** 0.31*** The table provides Pearson correlations for individual statements below the diagonal and Pearson correlations for group statements above the diagonal. ETR is income tax divided by PRETAX. PRETAX is calculated as net income plus total tax minus 0.95*dividends plus depreciation of financial assets. ROA is return on assets. DEBT is debt deflated by total assets. PPE is property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. INTANG is intangible assets deflated by total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. FAMILY is coded one if the majority of the shares is owned by families. STATE is coded one if the majority of the shares is owned by either the federal republic, the 16 states or any municipality. #SUBS is the number of subsidiaries of the group. #COUNTR is the number of different countries where the subsidiaries are located. IFRS is coded one if the financial statement is prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards. All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. ***/**/* mark significance at the 1/5/10% level. The dependent variable is ETR, which is income tax divided by PRETAX. PUBLIC is coded one if the respective firm is publicly listed. ROA is return on assets. DEBT is debt deflated by total assets. PPE is property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. INTANG is intangible assets deflated by total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. FAMILY is coded one if the majority of the shares is owned by families. STATE is coded one if the majority of the shares is owned by either the federal republic, the 16 states or any municipality. #SUBS is the number of subsidiaries of the group. IFRS is coded one if the financial statement is prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards. The models include fixed effects for time, industry (Ind.), legal form (LF) and countries of the subsidiaries (Sub Country) when indicated. Standard errors are clustered at firm level and are provided within the parentheses below the coefficients. All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. ***/**/* mark significance at the 1/5/10% level. The table provides OLS regression results using European data from individual statements. ETR is total tax expense divided by pre-tax income. PUBLIC is coded one if the respective firm is publicly listed. ROA is return on assets. DEBT is debt deflated by total assets. PPE is property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. INTANG is intangible assets deflated by total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of thousand total assets. FAMILY is coded one if the majority of the shares is owned by families. STATE is coded one if the majority of the shares is owned by either the federal republic, the states or any municipality. Standard errors are clustered at country level in the Model "All". Otherwise the models use robust standard errors and are provided within the parentheses below the coefficients. All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. ***/**/* mark significance at the 1/5/10% level. regression results using European data from group statements. ETR is total tax expense divided by pre-tax income. PUBLIC is coded one if the respective firm is publicly listed. ROA is return on assets. DEBT is debt deflated by total assets. PPE is property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. INTANG is intangible assets deflated by total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of thousand total assets. FAMILY is coded one if the majority of the shares is owned by families. STATE is coded one if the majority of the shares is owned by either the federal republic, the states or any municipality. #SUBS is the number of subsidiaries of the group. IFRS is coded one if the financial statement is prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards. The models include fixed effects for country, time, industry (Ind.) and countries of the subsidiaries (Sub C.) when indicated. Standard errors are clustered at country level in the Model "All". Otherwise the models use robust standard errors and are provided within the parentheses below the coefficients. All nondichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. ***/**/* mark significance at the 1/5/10% level. The table provides OLS regression results using European data from individual statements in Panel A and from group statements in Panel B. ETRTA is total tax expense divided by total assets. PUBLIC is coded one if the respective firm is publicly listed. Control variables and fixed effects are included in line with Table 7 and Table 8 . The models include fixed effects for time, industry, country, and countries of the subsidiaries (Sub Country) when indicated. Standard errors are clustered at country level in the Model "All". Otherwise the models use robust standard errors and are provided within the parentheses below the coefficients. All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. ***/**/* mark significance at the 1/5/10% level. The table provides OLS regression results using European data from individual and group statements. The sample is limited to firms that carried out an IPO within the observation period. ETR is total tax expense divided by pretax income. PUBLIC is coded one if the respective firm is publicly listed. ROA is return on assets. DEBT is debt deflated by total assets. PPE is property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. INTANG is intangible assets deflated by total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of thousand total assets. FAMILY is coded one if the majority of the shares is owned by families. Standard errors are clustered at firm level and are provided within the parentheses below the coefficients. All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. ***/**/* mark significance at the 1/5/10% level. The table provides OLS regression results using data from individual statements in Model 1 to Model 3, and data from group statements in Model 4 to Model 6. In contrast to all other tables, firm-years with negative pre-tax income are not deleted. All variables are calculated as the mean of all observations per firm over the sample period. Firms with a negative average pre-tax income are deleted from the sample. The independent variable is the long-run ETR, which is the average of effective tax rates. ETR is total tax expense divided by pre-tax income. ROA is return on assets. DEBT is debt deflated by total assets. PPE is property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. INTANG is intangible assets deflated by total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. FAMILY is coded one if the majority of the shares is owned by families. STATE is coded one if the majority of the shares is owned by either the federal republic, the 16 states or any municipality. #SUBS is the number of subsidiaries of the group. IFRS is coded one if the financial statement is prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards. The models include fixed effects for industry (Ind.), country and countries of the subsidiaries (Sub Country) when indicated. All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. ***/**/* mark significance at the 1/5/10% level.
